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Abstract. We study network formation with the bilateral link forma-
tion rule (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) with n players and link cost α ą 0.
After the network is built, an adversary randomly destroys one link ac-
cording to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorpo-
rates the expected number of players to which v will become discon-
nected. This model was previously studied for unilateral link formation
(K. 2011).
We prove existence of pairwise Nash equilibria under moderate assump-
tions on the adversary and n ě 9. As the main result, we prove bounds
on the price of anarchy for two special adversaries: one destroys a link
chosen uniformly at random, while the other destroys a link that causes a
maximum number of player pairs to be separated. We prove bounds tight
up to constants, namely Op1q for one adversary (if α ą 1
2
), and Θpnq
for the other (if α ą 2 considered constant and n ě 9). The latter is the
worst that can happen for any adversary in this model (if α “ Ωp1q).
Keywords: network formation, bilateral link formation, pairwise Nash
equilibrium, pairwise stability, price of anarchy, network robustness
Bibliographic Note. This extended abstract has been accepted at the 6th
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2013).
1 Network Formation Games
Network formation games are strategic games with a certain structure based on
players representing vertices in a graph; we will sometimes call a player also a
“vertex”. The set of players is V “ rns :“ {1, . . . , n}, n ě 3, and the strategy space
for each player is {0, 1}n. A strategy profile S “ pSvqvPV P {0, 1}nˆn determines
an undirected graphGpSq “ pV,EpSqq by the application of a link formation rule.
This rule is a parameter of the game. Two well-known rules are unilateral link
formation (ULF) and bilateral link formation (BLF), the latter being the main
topic of this work. Under ULF, the built graph is GpSq “ GUpSq “ pV,EUpSqq,
where
EUpSq :“ {{v, w} P (V
2
)
; Svw “ 1_ Swv “ 1} .
Under BLF, the built graph is GpSq “ GBpSq “ pV,EBpSqq, where
EBpSq :“ {{v, w} P (V
2
)
; Svw “ 1^ Swv “ 1} .
We omit the “U” and “B” superscripts from our notation if the link formation
rule is clear from context or if we refer to no specific one.
If Svw “ 1 then this is interpreted as the request by player v for a link to
player w. Under ULF, this request is enough to have the link built. Under BLF,
also the other player must request it, otherwise it is not built. Entries Svv are
of no concern. Denote by ∁EpSq :“
(
V
2
)
zEpSq the links that are not there. To
determine players’ costs, we need two more parameters: link cost α ą 0 and an
indirect cost function Iv for each player v, defined on all undirected graphs on
V . Player v’s cost under strategy profile S is then
CvpSq :“ |Sv|α` IvpGpSqq ,
where |Sv| denotes the number of 1s in Sv, i. e., |Sv| “
∑
wPV Svw. The first term,
|Sv|α, is called v’s building cost, and IvpGpSqq is called her indirect cost ; we also
write IvpSq :“ IvpGpSqq. An example for Iv is IvpGq “
∑
wPV distGpv, wq [6], the
sum-distance model, but many others are conceivable. Oftentimes, IvpGq “ 8 if
G is disconnected. We use total cost as the social cost, namely our social cost
is CpSq :“
∑
vPV CvpSq. For fixed parameters n, α, link formation rule, and
indirect cost function, we call S optimal if it has minimum social cost among all
strategy profiles. Denote OPT that minimum social cost.
Strategy profile S is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
CvpSq ď CvpS´v, Xq @v P V @X P {0, 1}n ,
where as usual pS´v, Xq denotes the strategy profile resulting from S by replacing
v’s strategy by X . So a NE is characterized by no player having an incentive to
deviate from her current strategy, assuming the strategies of the other players
fixed. For v, w P V denote S ` vw the strategy profile S1 with S1vw “ 1 and
otherwise identical to S. For v, w P V denote S´ vw the strategy profile S1 with
S1vw “ 0 and otherwise identical to S. Strategy profile S is called a pairwise Nash
equilibrium (PNE) if it is a NE and additionally
CvpS ` vw `wvq ď CvpSq ùñ CwpS ` vw `wvq ą CwpSq @ {v, w} P ∁EpSq . (1)
So each missing link requires the additional justification that it would be an
impairment for at least one of its endpoints. Strategy profile S is called pairwise
stable (PS) if (1) holds and
CvpS ´ vwq ě CvpSq @ {v, w} P EpSq . (2)
So pairwise stability (PS) is only concerned with single-link deviations. We call
a strategy profile S essential under ULF if Svw “ 1 implies Swv “ 0; we call it
essential under BLF if Svw “ 1 implies Swv “ 1. Since a player has to pay α for
each requested link, optima and equilibria of any of the three kinds (NE, PNE,
and PS) are essential and we will thus limit our studies to essential strategy
profiles in the following. With BLF, an essential strategy profile S is completely
determined by the built graph GpSq, and we call a graph G PS if G “ GpSq for
some PS strategy profile S.
NE is well suited for ULF. However, it is less well suited for BLF since the
strategy profile S “ 0, i. e., where no player issues any requests, is a NE under
BLF; indeed, due to the link formation rule, given S “ 0 no player can make
a change to her strategy that would have an effect on the graph built. Even
more, under BLF no player can unilaterally, i. e., by changing her strategy while
strategies of all other players are maintained, build a link. Under ULF, links can
be built unilaterally. Removal of links can happen unilaterally with ULF and
BLF. We say that a player removes or sells a link present in the built graph if
she changes her strategy so that this link will be no longer part of the built graph.
Removing or selling a link will make her building cost smaller by the amount
of α. We say that players build, add, or buy a link not present in the built graph
if they change their strategies so that this link will be part of the built graph.
With BLF, this can only happen when the two endpoints of the link agree on it,
and then building cost for each of them increases by α.
Since this work is concerned with BLF, we will use PNE and PS. Clearly,
if S is a PNE then S is PS. The converse holds if cost is convex on the set of
PS strategy profiles [5]. Convexity of cost relates removal of multiple links to
removal of each of those links alone. This addresses the difference between PNE
and PS: in the former, removal of multiple links has to be considered, whereas
the latter is only concerned with removal of single links. Let v P V and S a
strategy profile. We call Cv convex in S if for all k P rns and {w1, . . . , wk} Ď V
we have Cv (S ´ vw1 ´ . . .´ vwk) ´ CvpSq ě
∑k
i“1 (CvpS ´ pv, wiqq ´ CvpSq),
or, equivalently,
Iv
(
S ´ vw1 ´ . . .´ vwk
)
´ IvpSq ě
k∑
i“1
(
IvpS ´ vwiq ´ IvpSq
)
. (3)
We say that cost is convex if Cv is convex for each v and in each strategy profile S.
For fixed parameters n, α, link formation rule, indirect cost function, and
equilibrium concept (NE, PNE, PS), the price of anarchy [13] is defined as
max
S is an equilibrium
CpSq
OPT
.
2 Adversary Model
An adversary is a mapping assigning to each graph G “ pV,Eq a probability
measure PG on the links E of G. Given a connected graph G, the relevance of
a link e for a player v is the number of vertices that can, starting at v, only be
reached via e. We denote the relevance of e for v by relGpe, vq and the sum of all
relevances for a player by RGpvq :“
∑
ePE relGpe, vq. If P “ pv, . . . , wq is a path,
then denote relpP, vq :“
∑
ePEpP q relpe, vq and relpP,wq :“
∑
ePEpP q relpe, wq the
sum of relevances along P from the view of v or w, respectively. A link in a
connected graph is called a bridge if its removal destroys connectivity, or equiv-
alently, if it is no part of any cycle. The relevance relGpe, vq is 0 iff e is not a
bridge. Given a strategy profile S where GpSq is connected, we define the indirect
cost of player v by
IvpSq :“ IvpGpSqq :“
∑
ePEpSq
relGpSqpe, vq PGpSqp{e}q .
When S is clear from context, we omit “S” and “GpSq” from the notation and
we also write m :“ |EpSq| for the number of links. This indirect cost is the
expected number of vertices to which v will lose connection when exactly one
link is destroyed from GpSq randomly and according to the probability measure
given by the adversary. For this indirect cost, we use the term disconnection
cost in the following. We define disconnection cost to be 8 when GpSq is not
connected. It is easily seen that if S is an optimum, a NE under ULF, a PNE
under BLF, or PS under BLF, then GpSq is connected.
The separation seppeq of a link e is the number of ordered vertex pairs that
will be separated, i. e., pairs pv, wq for which no v-w path will exist anymore, when
e is destroyed. For a bridge e, denote νpeq the number of vertices in the connected
component of G ´ e that has a minimum number of vertices; note νpeq ď ⌊n
2
⌋.
If e is not a bridge, we define νpeq :“ 0. Then seppeq “ 2νpeq pn ´ νpeqq ď n2
and also seppeq “
∑
vPV relpe, vq. If e is a bridge, then seppeq ě 2 pn ´ 1q. We
can express the social cost now in terms of separation:
CpSq “ 2mα`
∑
vPV
∑
ePE
relpe, vqPp{e}q “ 2mα`
∑
ePE
seppeqPp{e}q .
Total building cost 2mα as given here is right for BLF; for ULF it would be mα.
We will consider two different adversaries. One is called simple-minded and
uses Pp{e}q “ 1
m
for each e P E, i. e., it destroys one link uniformly at random.
The other adversary is called smart and chooses the link to destroy uniformly at
random from Emax :“ {e P E; seppeq “ sepmax}, where sepmax :“ maxePE seppeq,
i. e., it chooses uniformly at random from the set of those links where each causes
a maximum number of vertex pairs to be separated.
Since optima are connected, they have social cost at least 2 pn´1qα. A rough
bound on the price of anarchy follows for any adversary:
2mα`
∑
ePE
seppeqPp{e}q
2 pn´ 1qα
“ O
(
mα` n2
∑
ePE
Pp{e}q
nα
)
“ O
(
m
n
`
n
α
)
. (4)
3 Previous and Related Work
Bilateral link formation follows a concept given by Myerson [12, p. 228] in a
different context. Jackson and Wolinsky [8] in 1996 introduced the equilibrium
concept of pairwise stability and discussed several variations of PS, including
what would later be known as PNE [8, p. 67]. Fabrikant, et al. [6] in 2003
initiated the quantitative study of the price of anarchy in a model that fits
into the framework considered here, as per Section 1. They considered ULF and
the sum-distance model, i. e., IvpGq “
∑
wPV distGpv, wq. Corbo and Parkes [5]
in 2005 initiated the study of the price of anarchy under BLF and discussed
convexity; the latter was also addressed by Calvó-Armengol and İlkiliç [3]. Since
then, numerous results have been published; we refer to [10, Sec. 4] for a more
comprehensive discussion. The adversary model was invented in 2010 [9], and an
Op1q bound on the price of anarchy for ULF for both the simple-minded and the
smart adversary was published in 2011 [10]; improved constants can be found
in [11]. Corresponding results for BLF were left to be established, and this is
accomplished here.
The adversary model addresses robustness. This has been done before, e. g.,
in the symmetric connections model [8,2] and extensions of it [1,14,7]. But all
of those models show substantial differences to the adversary model, the most
prominent being that in the adversary model, failures of different links are not
independent events (but mutually exclusive events) and that the adversarymodel
allows the probability of failure to depend on the built graph. We again refer
to [10, Sec. 4] for a more comprehensive discussion. An experimental robustness
study of an extended version of the sum-distance model is given in [4].
Generally, independent link failures model the unavailability of links due to,
e. g., deterioration, maintenance times, or influences affecting the whole infras-
tructure or large parts of it (e. g., natural disasters). Our adversary model, on
the other hand, models the situation when faced with an entity that is malicious
but only has limited means so that it can only destroy a limited number of links
– the number being limited to 1 for now.
Our Contribution. We prove existence of PNE and PS graphs in the adversary
model under moderate assumptions on the adversary and α ą 0 and n ě 9. As
the main result, we prove bounds on the price of anarchy, which are tight up
constants: an Op1q bound for the simple-minded adversary (if α ą 1
2
) and a
Θ
(
1` n
α
)
bound for the smart adversary (if α ą 2), both times under BLF and
for PNE as well as PS. Moreover, we prove that the simple-minded adversary
induces convex cost and thus PNE and PS coincide. The proof for the Op1q
bound uses a diameter argument, similar to ULF, but more complicated. The
key idea is to show that long paths are “unique” in certain sense (Proposition 6
and Lemma 7) in a PS graph.
Open Problems. Extensions to other adversaries would be interesting, e. g., when
Pp{e}q is proportional to seppeq. Allowing the adversary to destroy more than
one link appears to provide a challenging task, since our fundamental tool for
bounding the price of anarchy, the bridge tree (introduced in Section 5.3), ap-
pears inappropriate to capture relevant structure in that case.
Convexity of cost is also left open for the smart adversary. In [11], non-
convexity is shown, but only outside the set of PS graphs. It is not known
whether PS and PNE indeed diverge.
The Op1q bound on the price of anarchy is only claimed for α ą 1
2
. In
fact, it holds whenever we can strictly upper-bound the number of links in any
equilibrium by 2n, which is the case when α ą 1
2
. We also manage to go slightly
below 1
2
, showing O
(
1√
α
)
if α0pnq ď α ď 12 , where α0pnq «
1
8
for large n (given
more precisely later). We have no matching lower bound at this time, nor is the
range of α ă α0pnq well understood. This should be considered in future work.
Technical Note. In order not having to introduce names for all occurring con-
stants, we use “O” and “Ω” notation. For our results, we use this notation in the
following understanding: we write “x “ Opyq” if there exists a constant c ą 0
such that x ď cy. The constant may only depend on other constants and is in
particular independent of the non-constant quantities that constitute x and y,
e. g., parameters n and α. We do not implicitly require that some quantities, e. g.,
n, have to be large. Analogously, we write “x “ Ωpyq” if there exists a constant
c ą 0 such that x ě cy. Note that “O” indicates an upper bound, making no
statement about a lower bound; while “Ω” indicates a lower bound, making no
statement about an upper bound. We write x “ Θpyq if x “ Opyq and x “ Ωpyq;
the constants used in the “O” and the “Ω” statement may be different, of course.
The “o” notation is only used in one form, namely op1q substituting a quantity
that tends to 0 when n tends to infinity, regardless whether other parameters
are fixed or not. Whenever we write “op1q” in an expression, it is meant as an
upper bound, making no statement about a lower bound.
4 Optima and Equilibria
Existence of equilibria (PNE and PS) and structural results for optima and equi-
libria under moderate assumptions on the adversary (namely inducing anony-
mous cost, which is fulfilled by our simple-minded and smart one) follow easily
from what has been done for ULF in [10]. We give the details in Section A (Ap-
pendix) and merely provide a summary here. If α ď n ´ 1 then the cycle is
optimal with social cost 2nα. If α ě n ´ 1 then the star is optimal with social
cost 2 pn ´ 1q pα ` 1q ě 2nα. In any case, optimal social cost is Ωpnαq; it is
Θpnαq if α “ Ωp1q. Star and cycle also occur as PNE for the two adversaries:
the star for α ą 2 ´ 1
n´1 and the cycle for α ď
1
2
⌊n´1
2
⌋. If n ě 9, then those
regions overlap, so we have guaranteed existence of PNE for n ě 9.
5 Simple-Minded Adversary
We have for the simple-minded adversary cost and social cost:
CvpSq “ |Sv|α` 1
m
∑
ePE
relpe, vq “ |Sv|α` 1
m
Rpvq
CpSq “ 2mα`
1
m
∑
vPV
Rpvq “ 2mα`
1
m
∑
ePE
seppeq (5)
5.1 Convexity of Cost
Convexity is interesting since it implies PNE and PS being equivalent. The proof
of the following proposition is given in Section B
Proposition 1. Let G “ pV,Eq be a connected graph, v P V , e “ {v, w} P E,
and F Ď Ez {e} a set of links, each incident with v, so that G1 :“ G ´ F ´ e
is still connected. Let B1 be those links that are non-bridges in G but bridges
in G ´ e. Let B2 be those links that are non-bridges in G ´ F but bridges in
G´ F ´ e. Then B1 Ď B2.
Theorem 1. The simple-minded adversary induces convex cost.
Proof. Let v P V and w1, . . . , wk P V and S be a strategy profile. We show (3)
proceeding by induction on k. The case k “ 1 is clear. Let k ą 1 and set
S1 :“ S´vw1´. . .´vwk´1. We show that switching from S1 to S1´vwk increases
disconnection cost for v at least as much as switching from S to S ´ vwk, i. e.,
IvpS
1 ´ vwkq ´ IvpS
1q ě IvpS ´ vwkq ´ IvpSq . (6)
Denoting R1
1
:“ RS1´vwkpvq and R
1
2
:“ RS1pvq and R1 :“ RS´vwkpvq and R2 :“
RSpvq, a routine calculation using R11 ě R1 shows that to this end, it suffices to
prove R1
1
´R1
2
ě R1 ´R2 (have to consider dividing by the number of links).
As removing {v, wk}, relevance of zero or more links changes from 0 to a pos-
itive value; these are precisely those links which become bridges by the removal
and which were no bridges before. No relevance is reduced by a removal.
Let B1 be all those links that become bridges by the switch from S to S´vwk,
and let B2 those that become bridges by the switch from S1 to S1 ´ vwk. Then
B1 Ď B2 by Proposition 1. The increase in relevance from 0 to a positive value
for e P B1 given S1 is at least as high as when given S. In other words, while
{v, w1} , . . . , {v, wk´1} are removed, the effect of all links in B1 becoming bridges
is saved until the removal of {v, wk}. We have shown that R11 ´ R12 ě R1 ´ R2
and thus (6).
The proof is concluded by the following standard calculation:
IvpS ´ vw1 ´ . . .´ vwkq ´ IvpSq
“ IvpS
1 ´ vwkq ´ IvpS
1q ` IvpS
1q ´ IvpSq
ě IvpS ´ vwkq ´ IvpSq ` IvpS
1q ´ IvpSq by (6)
ě IvpS ´ vwkq ´ IvpSq `
k´1∑
i“1
(
IvpS ´ vwiq ´ IvpSq
)
by induction
“
k∑
i“1
(
IvpS ´ vwiq ´ IvpSq
)
.
5.2 Bounding Total Building Cost
As a first step towards our bound on the price of anarchy, we bound the number
of links and hence total building cost in a PS graph. A chord is a link between
two vertices on the same cycle. The following proposition was proved with 3n
in [10] and improved to 2n in [11].
Proposition 2. A chord-free graph on n vertices has strictly less than 2n links.
Proposition 3. Let a pairwise stable graph G be given.
(i) If α ą 1
2
, then G is chord-free and hence has ă 2n “ Opnq links.
(ii) In general, G is chord-free (with Opnq links) or has at most n√
2α
` 1 links.
Proof. If G is bridgeless, selling a chord is beneficial since disconnection cost 0
is maintained. So for both parts we assume that G contains bridges.
(i) The impairment in disconnection cost for a player v of selling a chord
is only due to the change in the denominator of the disconnection cost and is
precisely 1
m pm´1q Rpvq, which is upper-bounded by
1
2
since Rpvq ď n pn´1q
2
[10,
Prop. 8.3]. Hence if α is larger than that, there is an incentive to sell the chord.
(ii) Let G possess a chord. This means that any of its two endpoints, say v,
deems it being no impairment to pay α for this link, hence 1
m pm´1q Rpvq ě α. It
follows n2
2
ě
n pn´ 1q
2
ě Rpvq ě m pm´ 1qα ě pm´ 1q2 α ,
hence n√
2α
` 1 ě m.
5.3 Bounding Total Separation
Since the adversary only destroys one link, it can only cause damage if it chooses
a bridge. Therefore, the bridge structure of the built graph is important. Let
G “ pV,Eq be any connected graph. We call K Ď V a bridgeless connected
component or just component if it is inclusion-maximal under the condition that
the induced subgraphGrKs does not contain any bridges ofGrKs, or equivalently
does not contain any bridges of G. It is easy to see that the set of all components
forms a partition of V . The bridge tree G˜ “ pV˜ , E˜q of G is the following graph:
V˜ :“ {K Ď V ; K is a component}
E˜ :“
{
{K,K 1} P (V˜
2
)
; Dv P K,w P K 1 : {v, w} P E
}
Another way of thinking of the bridge tree is that we successively contract each
cycle to a new vertex which is adjacent to all vertices that had a neighbor in
the contracted cycle. If for each v P V we denote κpvq the unique component
with v P κpvq, then it is easy to see that {v, w} ÞÑ {κpvq, κpwq} is a bijection
between the bridges of G and the links of G˜. In the game theoretic situation, we
look at the bridge tree of the built graph GpSq. When considering the effect of
building additional links, we may treat vertices of the bridge tree as players. This
is justified since links inside components have 0 relevance. Hence for a strategy
profile S and {K,K 1} P (V˜
2
)
the effect in disconnection cost of a new link between
a player from K and a player from K 1 is specific to the pair {K,K 1} and not
to the particular players. Note also that a link e “ {v, w} with v, w in the same
component not only has relpe, xq “ 0 for all x P V , but also seppeq “ 0.
Knowing this we will only work with the bridge tree during the rest of this
section, so all vertices, links, and paths are in the bridge tree. We also make the
convention that whenever we speak of the number of vertices in a subgraph T of
the bridge tree, we count |v| for each vertex v P V pT q, i. e., we count the vertices
that are in the respective components (illustration in Section C, Appendix). We
call a bridge tree PS if it stems from a PS graph.
The proof of the following remark is straightforward:
Remark 4. Let P “ pv, . . . , wq be a path (reminder: in the bridge tree). The
benefit in disconnection cost of bypassing P can be lower-bounded:
IvpGq ´ IvpG` {v, w}q ě
∑
ePEpP q relpe, vq
m` 1
“
relpP, vq
m` 1
.
The following bound on total separation holds for all connected graphs:
Lemma 5 ([10, Cor. 8.12]). For each v we have Rpvq ď pn´ 1q diampG˜q, hence∑
ePE
seppeq ă n2 diampG˜q .
Since m ě n´ 1, it follows that total disconnection cost is bounded by
n2
m
diampG˜q “ n diampG˜q p1` op1qq ,
where op1q is for nÑ8. Under ULF, if S is a NE then diampG˜pSqq “ Opαq [10,
Lem. 8.13], by which an Op1q bound is obtained. If we could prove the same
for BLF and PS, we would be done. However, an example shows that there is
no hope for this; the diameter of a PS bridge tree can be Ωp
√
nq (Section D,
Appendix). The trick to handle this situation is to prove that essentially, there
is only one such long path. Note that in non-PS graphs, total separation can be
Ωpn3q, e. g., if the graph is a path.
For a moment, orient the links of the bridge tree according to the rule that e “
{v, w} is oriented pv, wq if relpe, vq ď relpe, wq, i. e., links point in the direction of
fewer vertices, ties broken arbitrarily. Due to cycle-freeness, there is a vertex u
having only out-links; and since each vertex has at most one in-link, this vertex
u is unique. We consider the bridge tree rooted at u and discard the orientation,
it has served its purpose. Denote levpvq the level of v in the rooted bridge tree,
in particular levpuq “ 0 and levpvq “ 1 for v P Npuq. Each of the subtrees rooted
at some v P Npuq is called a branch of the bridge tree.
A path P “ pv, . . . , wq is called v-limited if relpP, vq ď 2nα. It is called w-
limited if relpP,wq ď 2nα. A path is called a branch path if it traverses each level
at most once, i. e., it runs straight up or down and in particular stays within one
branch plus u. A branch path P “ pv, . . . , wq with levpvq ă levpwq is called
outward-limited if it is v-limited and is called inward-limited if it is w-limited.
Denote the constant c :“ 4 and also α0pnq :“ 18
(
1` 1
n´1
)2
ď 9
32
. We have:
Proposition 6. Let α ě α0pnq.
(i) In a PS bridge tree, each path P “ pv, . . . , wq is v-limited or w-limited (or
both). In particular, each branch path is inward-limited or outward-limited
(or both).
(ii) An inward-limited path has length at most cα “ Opαq.
(iii) In a PS bridge tree, no more than one branch contains a path not being
inward-limited.
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary, i. e., relpP, vq ą 2nα and relpP,wq ą 2nα. Then
for each x P e :“ {v, w} by Remark 4 and Proposition 3 we have, using α ě α0pnq
for the second case (i. e., when α ď 1
2
),
IxpGq ´ IxpG` eq ą
2nα
m` 1
ě
{
2nα
2n
“ α
2nα
n√
2α
`2 ě α
,
a contradiction to PS.
(ii) Let P “ pv, . . . , wq be inward-limited with levpvq ă levpwq and of length ℓ.
LetN :“ n´n1 with n1 the number of vertices in P ’s branch; then by construction
N ě n
2
. It follows 2nα ě relpP,wq ě Nℓ ě n
2
ℓ, hence 4α ě ℓ. (This type of
argument is the basis for diampG˜pSqq “ Opαq for ULF in [10, Lem. 8.13].)
(iii) Assuming the contrary, let pv, . . . , wq and px, . . . , yq with levpvq ă levpwq
and levpxq ă levpyq from different branches and both not inward-limited. Then
pw, . . . , v, . . . , u, . . . , x, . . . , yq is not w-limited nor y-limited, contradicting (i).
Lemma 7. In a PS graph with α ě α0pnq, total separation is bounded by 2 p2`
cqn2α.
Proof. Let P “ pu, . . . , wq be a path of maximum length ℓ among all path
starting at u. If ℓ ď cα, we are done by Lemma 5. Otherwise, if ℓ ą cα, by
Proposition 6(ii), P is not inward-limited. By Proposition 6(iii), branch paths in
all other branches are inward-limited and hence of length at most cα.
We consider paths in P ’s branch of the form Q “ px, . . . , yq with x P V pP q
and y ‰ w a leaf. Denote k :“ cα ` 1 if cα is integer and k :“ ⌈cα⌉ otherwise.
Call the final k vertices of P (before it ends with w) its lower part and the other
vertices (starting with u) its upper part. If Q attaches in the lower part of P ,
i. e., x is in the lower part, then |Q| ď k ´ 1 ď cα since P has maximum length.
If, on the other hand, Q attaches to the upper part of P , then A :“ pw, . . . , xq
has length at least k ą cα. Denote B :“ pw, . . . , x, . . . , yq. If Q is not inward-
limited, then B is not y-limited, by Proposition 6(i) it is hence w-limited. In
particular, A is w-limited, hence inward-limited and thus of length at most cα,
a contradiction. It follows that Q is inward-limited and so |Q| ď cα.
We bound sums of separation values. Since P is not inward-limited, it is
outward-limited, i. e., u-limited. Denote P “ pu “ w0, . . . , wℓ “ wq. It follows∑
ePEpP q
seppeq “ 2
∑
e“{wi,wi`1}PEpP q
relpe, wiq relpe, wi`1q
ď 2
∑
e“{wi,wi`1}PEpP q
relpe, uqn “ 2n relpP, uq ď 4n2α .
(7)
If we bypass P , i. e., add {u,w}, then separation values for all e P E1 :“ EzEpP q
are maintained. Hence we can compute
∑
ePE1 seppeq as if P had been bypassed.
But with the bypass, the diameter of the bridge tree is 2cα by what we have
established above. By Lemma 5 it follows
∑
ePE1 seppeq ď n
2 ¨2cα. Together with
(7), the bound on total separation follows.
Theorem 2. Price of anarchy for the simple-minded adversary with BLF and
PNE or PS is 1 ` p2 ` cq p1 ` op1qq “ 1 ` 6 ¨ p1 ` op1qq “ Op1q if α ą 1
2
and
max
{
1, 1√
8α
}
`p2` cq p1` op1qq “ O
(
1√
α
)
if α0pnq ď α ď
1
2
, where op1q is for
nÑ8.
Proof. Recall the lower bound of 2nα for an optimum. By Proposition 3, for
total building cost we have the ratio of equilibrium to optimum bounded by
2nα
2nα
“ 1 if α ą 1
2
and otherwise, if α ď 1
2
, the same bound or:
n√
2α
α` α
2nα
“
1√
8α
` op1q .
For total disconnection cost, using m ě n´ 1, we have the bound:
2 p2`cqn2α
m
2nα
“
p2` cqn
m
ď p2` cq
n
n´ 1
“ p2` cq p1` op1qq .
6 Smart Adversary
Recall that the smart adversary destroys one link uniformly at random from
Emax “ {e P E; seppeq “ sepmax}. We call the links in Emax the critical links.
Remark 8. A PS graph is chord-free for the smart adversary.
Proof. Removing a chord does not change the relevance of any link, nor does
it change sep
max
p“ maxe seppeqq, hence it does not change Emax. A player will
hence always opt to remove a chord and so avoid the expense of α.
Given chord-freeness, we have the bound of 2n “ Opnq on the links in a PS
graph. As seen by (4), this implies a bound of O
(
1` n
α
)
on the price of anarchy.
This bound holds for any adversary provided that m “ Opnq in all equilibria. It
is tight for the smart adversary and BLF as shown by the following example.
Theorem 3. Let n ě 9 and α ą 2, then the price of anarchy for PNE and PS
with the smart adversary is Ωp1 ` n
α
q.
Proof. Assume there is an integer n0 ě 3 such that n “ 3n0´2; the general case
can be proved in a similar way. Consider three stars Ui, i “ 1, 2, 3 with center
vertices ui, i “ 1, 2, 3, and n0, n0´1, and n0´2 vertices, respectively. Connect the
stars via an additional vertex u0 and additional links {u0, ui}, i “ 1, 2, 3. This
construction uses 3n0´2 vertices. Then e0 “ {u0, u1} is the only critical link and
n0 “ Θpnq, namely slightly more than 13n. We have a total disconnection cost of
2νpe0q pn´ νpe0qq “ 2n0 pn´n0q “ Ωpn
2q, and so a social cost of Ωpnα`n2q. It
follows a ratio to the optimum of Ωp1` n
α
q. We are left to show that this graph
is a PNE, which implies PS. Clearly, no link can be sold, since that would make
Fig. 1: Three stars of sizes n0, n0´1,
and n0´2; here n0 “ 5. The n0 play-
ers in the star around u1 would like
to put the one critical link {u0, u1}
on a cycle, if α ă n0. Building, e. g.,
{u1, u2} would reduce their discon-
nection cost from n ´ n0 to n0 ´ 2,
meaning an improvement of n0. But
no player from the stars around u2
or u3 is willing to cooperate.
u0
u1
u2
u3
the graph disconnected. Therefore we only have to ensure that no link can be
added that would be beneficial for one endpoint and at least no impairment for
the other one, i. e., we have to show (1).
A link e that improves disconnection cost for some player has to put {u0, u1}
on a cycle. If e connects a vertex in U1 with a vertex in U2, then {u0, u3} will
become critical. For a vertex in U2, this reduces disconnection cost from n0 to
n0 ´ 2. So, since α ą 2, no vertex in U2 agrees to build such a link.
A similar situation holds if e connects a vertex in U1 with a vertex in U3`u0.
It will result in {u0, u2} becoming critical. For a vertex in U3 ` u0, this reduces
disconnection cost from n0 to n0´1. So, since α ą 1, no vertex in U3`u0 agrees
to build such a link.
If we consider α ą 2 a constant, this theorem gives a lower bound of Ωpnq.
For α “ Ωp1q this is by (4) the worst that can happen for any adversary in this
model (note m ď n2). This is particularly noteworthy since for ULF and NE,
the smart adversary has a price of anarchy of Op1q [10, Thm. 9.8].
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Appendix
A Optima and Equilibria
For optima, we repeat a proof from [10, Prop. 7,1] for ULF with minimal modi-
fications, which adapt it to BLF. This result is for a general adversary, i. e., one
that destroys one link according to some probability measure P on the links of
the built graph.
Proposition 9. An optimum has social cost Ωpnαq, and Θpnαq if α “ Ωp1q.
More precisely:
(i) If α ď n´ 1, the cycle is an optimum; it has social cost 2nα.
(ii) If α ě n´ 1, a star is an optimum; it has social cost 2 pn´ 1q pα` 1q.
Proof. An optimum can only be the cycle or a tree, because any graph containing
a cycle has already the building cost nα of the cycle, and the cycle has optimal
disconnection cost. So an optimum is either the cycle, or it is cycle-free. Let T
be any tree. We have its disconnection cost:∑
ePEpT q
seppeqPp{e}q “ 2
∑
ePEpT q
νpeq pn´ νpeqqPp{e}q
ě 2 ¨ 1 pn´ 1q
∑
ePEpT q
Pp{e}q “ 2 pn´ 1q .
We use that the function x ÞÑ 2x pn´ xq is (strictly) increasing on r1, n
2
s for the
lower bound. We conclude that the social cost of a tree is at least
2 pn´ 1qα` 2 pn´ 1q “ 2 pn´ 1q pα` 1q . (8)
Social cost of the cycle is 2nα. So if α ď n ´ 1, the cycle is better or as good
as any tree, hence it is an optimum. If α ą n´ 1, then we look for a good tree.
A star has social cost 2 pn´ 1q pα` 1q, which matches the lower bound (8) and
is hence optimal (and better than the cycle).
Note that, indeed, for α “ n´1, cycle and star co-exist as optima with social
cost 2nα “ 2n pn´ 1q “ 2 pα` 1q pn´ 1q.
For equilibria, we also build on the results from [10]. We call a NE S a
maximal Nash equilibrium (MaxNE) if CvpS ` vw1 ` . . . ` vwkq ą CvpSq for
all k P rns and {v, w1} , . . . , {v, wk} P ∁EpSq and v P V . That is, we exclude
the possibility that a player can buy additional links so that the gain in her
indirect cost and the additional building cost nullify each other. We make the
convention that whenever we speak of NE or MaxNE, we mean that relative to
ULF. Whenever we speak of PNE or PS, we mean that relative to BLF.
We also need the notion of anonymous cost. We call indirect cost anonymous
if for each built graph G “ pV,Eq and each graph automorphism φ : V ÝÑ V of
G, we have IvpGq “ IφpvqpGq for all v P V . In other words, anonymity of indirect
cost means that IvpGq does not depend on v’s identity, but only on v’s position
in the built graph G. This is of importance in particular if G has symmetry.
For instance, if G is a cycle and indirect cost is anonymous, then all vertices
experience the same indirect cost. If G is a path and indirect cost is anonymous,
then both endpoints experience the same indirect cost. It is easy to see that both
our adversaries, the simple-minded and the smart one, induce anonymous cost.
For ULF, we cite the following two propositions from [10] without proofs.
Strategy profiles are described by directed graphs. This is straightforward: a
strategy profile S P {0, 1}nˆn can be interpreted as the adjacency matrix for a
directed graph on V “ rns, and vice versa. A directed link pv, wq in that graph
means a request by v for the link {v, w}. Under ULF, such a request results in
the link being built, and then we call v the owner of the link. Since we restrict
to essential strategy profiles, under ULF there is always exactly one owner per
link.
Proposition 10 ([10, Prop. 7.3]). Let S be a star with links pointing outward
(i. e., the built graph is a star and all links are paid for by the center vertex).
(i) If α ě n´ 1, then S is a NE.
(ii) If α ě 2´ 1
n´1 , then S is a NE if disconnection cost is anonymous.
In both cases, strict inequality implies a MaxNE.
Proposition 11 ([10, Prop. 7.4]). Let S be a cycle with all links pointing in
the same direction (either all clockwise or all counter-clockwise).
(i) If α ď 1, then S is a MaxNE.
(ii) If α ď 1
2
⌊n´1
2
⌋, then S is a MaxNE if disconnection cost is anonymous.
Corollary 12. For anonymous disconnection cost, MaxNE exist for all ranges
of α ą 0 provided that n ě 9.
Proof. Just note that 2´ 1
n´1 ă 2 ď
1
2
⌊n´1
2
⌋ for n ě 9 and invoke the preceding
propositions.
Certain classes of simple-structured MaxNE under ULF are PNE under BLF.
The following two propositions hold in a more general setting, not limited to the
adversarymodel. Let S be a strategy profile. Define SB by SBvw :“ min {1, Svw ` Swv}
for all v, w P V . Then GUpSq “ GBpSBq. In other words, forming SB means
adding to S the necessary requests so that for BLF the same graph is built as
we have for ULF.
Proposition 13. Let S be a MaxNE under ULF with G :“ GUpSq being a cycle
and using anonymous indirect cost. Then SB is a PNE under BLF.
Proof. By the definition of MaxNE, any additional link is an impairment for the
buyer. So the premise of (1) is never true, i. e., all absent links are justified.
New links cannot be formed unilaterally. We are hence left to show that
each link is wanted by both endpoints, i. e., none of the endpoints can improve
her individual cost by deleting the link. Let v be the owner of a link {v, w}
under ULF. Since we have a NE there, v cannot improve her individual cost by
selling this link. Selling the link means that v would be at the end of the path
G´ {v, w}. By anonymity of indirect cost we conclude: it is worth or at least no
impairment paying α for not being at the end of the path that results from G by
deletion of one link. Therefore, both of each two neighboring vertices maintain
their requests in SB for having a link between them.
Proposition 14. Let S be a MaxNE under ULF with G :“ GUpSq being a tree.
Let indirect cost assign 8 to a disconnected graph. Then SB is a PNE under BLF.
Proof. As in the previous proposition, (1) follows from the properties of a MaxNE.
So we are left to consider removals. Since the final graph is a tree, removal of
any link would make it disconnected, yielding indirect cost 8. Hence no player
wishes to remove a link.
We turn to the adversary model. It follows from the two previous propositions
that the equilibrium existence results from Proposition 10, Proposition 11 and
Corollary 12 carry over from MaxNE to PNE. We so have:
Corollary 15. For anonymous disconnection cost (which includes the simple-
minded and the smart adversary) PNE, and hence also PS graphs, exist under
BLF for α ą 0 and n ě 9.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Remark 16. Let G “ pV,Eq be a graph and e “ {v, w} P E a non-bridge and
C any cycle with e P EpCq. Then all bridges of G´ e that are non-bridges in G,
are in EpCq.
Proof. Let f be a non-bridge in G and a bridge in G´ e. Then G´ e consists of
two subgraphs G1 and G2 that are connected only by f . Since f was no bridge
before e was removed, e must also connect G1 with G2. Moreover, there are no
other links between G1 and G2. It follows that any cycle that contains e also
contains f .
Proof of Proposition 1. Since G1 is connected, there is a path pv, e1, v1, . . . , wq
in G1. Then the cycle C :“ pv, . . . , w, e, vq is in G ´ F . By Remark 16, we have
B1 Ď EpCq. Hence all links in B1 are on a cycle that is not destroyed by removal
of F , so no link in B1 is made a bridge by removal of F . It follows B1 Ď B2.
C Illustration for the Bridge Tree
(a) A graph G.
7
34
(b) The corresponding bridge tree G˜.
Fig. 2: Bridge tree construction. Vertices representing components of more than
1 vertices have their number of vertices attached, here 4, 7, and 3, respectively.
D Lower Bound on the Diameter
Fig. 3: Cycle with path attached, here n “ 16 and ℓ “ 4.
Proposition 17. For α “ 1, the bridge tree can have diameter Ωp
√
nq, even if
the graph is PS.
Proof. Consider a cycle with a path of length ℓ attached to it with one of its
ends, as shown in Figure 3. Diameter of the corresponding bridge tree is ℓ. Let
n be the total number of vertices and let 1
n
ℓ pℓ`1q
2
ď α ď 1
n
ppn´ℓq´1q pn´ℓq
2
; such
an α exists if n ě 3ℓ. Because of the lower bound on α, no vertex on the cycle
wishes to connect to a vertex on the path, and also no vertex on the path wishes
to connect to a vertex that is located away from the cycle. Because of the upper
bound on α, it can also be shown easily that no two neighboring vertices on the
cycle wish to sell the link between them. Trivially, no link on the path will be
sold. Hence this graph is PS. However, we can choose n ě 9, ℓ :“ ⌊√n⌋, and
α :“ 1, and so have a diameter of Ωp
√
nq in the corresponding bridge tree.
Remark 18. In accordance with Theorem 2, this example does not provide a
price of anarchy beyond Θp1q.
Proof. Social cost is
2nα`
1
n
2
ℓ∑
k“1
pn´ kq k “ 2nα`
ℓ pℓ` 1q
n
(
n´
2ℓ` 1
3
)
.
For a lower bound on the price of anarchy, we have to divide this by the optimum,
which is 2nα since α ď n ´ 1. So we choose α as small as possible, i. e., α “
1
n
ℓ pℓ`1q
2
, hence 2nα “ ℓ pℓ` 1q. It follows a lower bound on the price of anarchy
of only:
1`
1
n
(
n´
2ℓ` 1
3
)
“ 1`
(
1´
2ℓ` 1
3n
)
ď 2 “ Θp1q .
